The Western powers gave Haftar an ultimatum: embark or be marginalized. Several EU governments and people close to the presidency have tried to get closer, suggesting that if it recognises the Council`s authority, all of them, including Article 8, could be discussed. [fn] UN special envoy Martin Kobler likened the deal to a “train that has already left the station” and called on opponents of the deal to get on board. Interview, Al-Jazeera, 6 December 2015. According to a Libyan political analyst sympathetic to the HoR, “the politics of some in the West and at the UN.. To undermine Haftar and weaken his position until he submits or is eliminated. Tweet, Mohamed Eljarh, @Eljarh, May 23, 2016. Interviews with crisis groups, Western diplomats, UN officials, Tunis, Rome, New York, March-June 2016.Hide the footnote However, many in his camp seem to believe that the Council`s dependence on Tripoli militias and repeated violations of agreed procedures (mainly for the approval of the agreement by the Czech Upper Republic) make it untrustworthy. Following the creation of the GNC in 2012, several political groups expressed concern about its actions. According to this logic, a compromise is not desirable if it is considered a success for a rival. [fn] Skepticism about a truly unified international position is high in the diplomatic circles of the United Nations and the West. A European diplomat noted that “we know on paper that to resolve the Libyan conflict there must be alignment between internationals, but the Russians have absolutely no incentive to stop playing their own game, mainly pushed by their anti-American adversaries.
Positions on several fronts.” Interviews with the Crisis Group, Brussels, September 2016; Foreign businessmen working in Libya, Rome, London, September 2016.Hide the footnote Nevertheless, the status quo (a deteriorating situation) can only lead to a protracted conflict that would plunge Libya into new chaos, without a certain victory for either side, great damage to the economy and few opportunities that many hope for in post-conflict reconstruction. United Nations Missions in Libya. (December 2015). Political agreement in Libya. A major flaw in the strategy of creating facts on the ground by recognizing a unity government was that it was difficult to see how the international goals – fighting Daesh and stemming the flow of refugees through Libya – could be sustainable without better governance and a genuine broad consensus between state institutions and the military. Progress in the fight against Daesh in Sirte has not addressed Libya`s political and institutional divisions or, as some supporters had hoped, convinced factions and their regional supporters that national unity could be achieved through an anti-IS coalition under the auspices of the Council. [fn] The lack of a safe route was frustrating for many Western officials. An Italian diplomat accused UNSMIL of not having the necessary knowledge of local dynamics to start a dialogue on security. Interview with the Crisis Group, Rome, September 2015. On the eve of the signing, a senior EU official admitted: “I recognise that it was a mistake not to work on the safety path from the beginning. If we manage to find the right security path, then the political path can be successful, but not the other way around. Interview with the Crisis Group, Brussels, 7 December 2015.
Interviews with crisis groups, Western diplomats, UN officials, Tunis, Brussels, Washington, January-March 2016.Hide the footnote Many in the first camp were overly optimistic about the possible acceptance of an agreement imposed on recalcitrant factions. The focus on eliminating ISIS in Sirte, which they hoped would set the anti-jihadist credentials of the Misratan forces for states like Egypt, which have long maintained that Haftar is the only leader to confront the jihadists, overshadowed other factors. [fn] Interviews with crisis groups, Egyptian diplomats, military, Cairo, New York, June 2015-May 2016. Egyptian officials say jihadist groups have ties to some Western Libyan armed groups, particularly some powerful Tripoli-based groups on which the Presidential Council depended. Interview with the Crisis Group, Egyptian diplomat, May 2016. According to Libyan security officials and residents of areas formerly under ISIS control, many Egyptians were in ISIS`s ranks. Interviews with Crisis Group, intelligence officer, Misrata, residents of Ben Jawwad, October 2016.Hide Footnote The bet that the Agreement`s roadmap could be implemented even without HoR`s support underestimated the extent to which opponents could exploit this to win support from the East. It has been easy to portray the United Nations as biased, thus hindering its impartial role as a mediator. Conversely, those who supported Haftar and undermined a lip service agreement derailed the process, but did not provide constructive alternatives. If they want to maintain a united Libya and prevent the conflict from turning into a worse confrontation, they must set limits on their client. We still have a long way to go.
The Single Executive Authority must implement the ceasefire agreement, provide basic public services to the Libyan people, launch a meaningful reconciliation programme, address critical national budgetary needs and hold national elections. The new transitional government to be proposed by the Prime Minister-designate should be truly inclusive and allow for the representation of all Libyans, including in terms of gender, ethnicity and regional background. At the same time as the Libyan political agreement was signed, the two rival parliaments, the Libyan House of Representatives and the GNC, signed a declaration of principles in Tunis aimed at establishing a government of national unity. Although this new agreement took place alongside the Libyan political agreement, it was separate from the UN-led agreement, a peace process that struggled to prove acceptable to the GNC or the Libyan House of Representatives. This new declaration included the creation of a committee of 10 members, 5 on each side, which would collectively choose an interim prime minister and two MPs with full parliamentary elections within two years. [48] With the Libyan political agreement, signed on September 17. Signed in Skhirat (Morocco) in December 2015, a “Presidential Council of the Council of Ministers” was created to function until the appointment of a government of national unity. [fn] The text of the agreement has not been published for more than a month. It consists of a preamble and 67 articles, additional provisions (fifteen articles) and six annexes. Hide footnote It consisted of a President of the Council (who is considered the Prime Minister-designate of the future government), five MPs (Deputy Prime Ministers-designate) and three Ministers of State, each representing a different political and geographical constituency. .