The Harare roundtable concluded on the night of 12 August. Tsvangirai expressed his continued commitment to dialogue on August 13, saying any agreement “must prioritize people, not leadership positions and titles”; Meanwhile, Mbeki, who had left Zimbabwe, said it was still “possible to conclude these negotiations fairly quickly.”  When Tsvangirai traveled to Harare airport on August 14 to travel to Johannesburg for a SADC summit, his emergency travel documents were confiscated by members of the Central Intelligence Organization (his passport had expired and he could not renew it); However, the documents were quickly returned and Tsvangirai left for the summit.   According to Charamba, Mugabe`s spokesman, Tsvangirai`s documents were only valid for travel to Angola, and he denied the MDC`s claims that two other members of the MDC delegation at the summit, Biti and Eliphas Mukonoweshuro, had also had their passports confiscated. Later, on October 13, Mbeki arrived in Zimbabwe to facilitate negotiations.  Mugabe and Tsvangirai met for more than seven hours on October 14, but no agreement was reached.  Talks over the next two days did not result in an agreement, but on October 16, Mugabe expressed optimism about the possibility of an agreement the next day, stressing the “need for a compromise on both sides.” Chamisa said there was “a little bit of movement, but not enough.” According to some reports, the control of the Ministry of the Interior remained a major stumbling block; ZANU-PF reportedly offered the MDC the Ministry of Finance and proposed that the parties alternate control of the Ministry of interior, but the MDC reportedly rejected this proposal.  The Mbeki government was also very sensitive to being seen as a regional tyrant, advancing its own agendas in conflict situations and thus pursuing the ambitions of the apartheid state. On the Zimbabwe issue, South Africa`s broader ambition to lead the continent and become a global player meant that it had to “walk a tightrope to keep South Africa`s continental ambitions alive (by not speaking out against mugabe`s regime) without fully sacrificing Western support” (Freeman, 2005, p. 1). 156), and also attempted to combine the “rhetoric and energy” of Pan-Africanism with a struggle to reform the world order (Habib, 2009). In an article written about Zimbabwe shortly after taking office as head of state, Mbeki explained a key aspect of his assessment of the problem and his position on the “Party of the Revolution”, ZANU-PF: Negotiators met briefly on October 7, but failed to reach an agreement.
According to Chamisa, the parties were “still in a fundamental way in different worlds.”  Biti, for his part, said he and his MDC negotiating colleague Elton Mangoma left the meeting outraged after ZANU-PF negotiators said they were only present “to justify why they needed the two interior and finance ministries.” Biti insisted that the MDC had never accepted the allocation of ministries and that it was misleading for ZANU-PF to claim that there were only two points of contention. He expressed hope that Mbeki could help resolve the situation, saying that if Mbeki fails, the only hope left is divine intervention. At the time, it was reported that the power-sharing agreement was on the verge of collapse; According to reports, some members of the ZANU-PF leadership insisted that the party should hold key portfolios, believing that ZANU-PF would be in great danger if it did not control these ministries.  ANC President Jacob Zuma said on the same day that he hoped the Zimbabwean parties could reach an agreement themselves, but he also said mbeki was available to facilitate negotiations if necessary.  This article attempted to argue, using the Gramscian concept of “passive revolution,” that Zimbabwe`s democratic forces became part of a passive revolution through two processes. .